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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
Guderian: "How many people do you think even know where Kursk is? It's a matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not. I repeat my question, why do you want to attack in the east at all this year?"
Hitler: "You're quite right, whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns over."
Guderian: "In that case your reaction to this problem is the correct one, leave it alone!" Heinz Guderian 1 
May 1943
There is much speculation about whether the battle of Kursk was decisive. Such discussions focus on comparative attrition and replacement rates, growing Soviet competence on the field of battle, the over extension of German forces, etc. One thing, however, is certain:
after the Wehrmacht's defeat at Kursk, Germany began a downward slide from which it never 
THE EASTERN FRONT: JUNE 1941 -MARCH 1943
At the launching of 'Barbarossa' on June 22 nd of 1941, the Wehrmacht enjoyed unprecedented success. They managed to encircle and destroy numerous Soviet armies: the and 37 th Armies were surrounded resulting in 452,700 encircled contributing to a total loss of 616,304 Russians killed, captured or missing in the Battle for Kiev. 5, 6 By the end of September of 1941, it is estimated that the Wehrmacht had captured or killed nearly two and a half million Russian soldiers and destroyed massive amounts of equipment: 22,000 guns, 18,000 tanks, and 14,000 aircraft. 7 Additional catastrophes for the Red Army continued: the Vyazma and Bryansk encirclements in mid October of 1941 resulted in 688,000 captured with a likely total of one million Russians lost and the destruction of seven armies 8 inflicting an additional two million dead or captured by the end of December. 9 When the German 1941 offensive ended on the 5 th of December, German armor and men were within 20 kilometers of Moscow. 10 German officers could see traffic in the streets of the city through their field glasses. 11 Indeed many believed that the Red Army was on the verge of collapse. This was truly the high water mark for the German Army on the Eastern Front. But what came next was a foreshadowing of things to come.
The fact that the Russians were nearly vanquished at the end of 1941 seemed lost on the Russians themselves. "The Germans were struck by the tenacity of the Red Army. The uneasy feeling that they were fighting something of almost supernatural strength was widespread among the German soldiers, particularly the infantry, and can be traced in their letters and diaries----alternating with periods of triumph and exultation". 12 It was this incredible resilience of the Russian soldier, this "never say die" attitude that would haunt their German invaders throughout the campaign. 28 The rasputitsa, or spring thaw, made movement of armor impossible and brought all major offensive movement to a halt.
The lull was a welcome respite for battle-weary forces to rest and replenish their ranks.
Offensive operations would have to wait until the ground was dry enough to support the movement of armor. In the meantime, Hitler and the German High Command were drawn to a bulge in the line on their battle maps known as the Kursk salient, a feature that would not be overlooked by Stalin or his generals. Thus, the stage was set for the German summer offensive of 1943 and the gamble that was the Kursk offensive.
STATEGIC MOTIVATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE
"The victory at Kursk must serve as a beacon to the world. Every officer and every man must be imbued with the significance of this attack." Therefore, it is necessary for us to attack before the Russians on individual sections of the front as soon as possible and take the initiative into our hands in this fashion, on at least one sector of the front at the present (as is already the case with Heeresgruppe Sud ). On the other sectors of the front we must allow the enemy to bleed to death. We must conscientiously plan our defenses in depth through use of heavy defensive weapons, development of positions, appropriately laid minefields, preparation of support positions, accumulation of mobile reserves and other measures. 41 Here, Hitler's plan is clear, a localized offensive with the remainder of the front managed as a static defense line. The order gets more specific further on:
A strong Panzer-Armee is to immediately be formed on the northern wing of Heeresgruppe Sud. Its formation is to be completed by the middle of April so that it can go over to the offensive at the end of the mud season before the Russians. The goal of this offensive is the destruction of the enemy forces in front of the 2. Armee by means of an advance to the north from the area of Khar'kov in cooperation with an attack group from the zone of 2. Panzer Armee. Details of these attacks, the command and control structure and the moving up of forces will be given in separate orders.
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These separate orders were issued on 15 April 1943 as Operation Order No. 6, the rationale and design for 'Citadel', the offensive operation to eliminate the Kursk salient. 43 Every officer and every man must be imbued with the significance of this attack. The victory at Kursk must serve as a beacon to the world. Therefore I order:
1.) The objective of the attack is to surround the enemy forces in the Kursk sector and destroy them with concentric attacks. The attacks will be conducted incisively, in a coordinated manner, ruthlessly and rapidly by one field army attacking from the area of Bjelgorod and one field army attacking from south of Orel. 44 In support of these directives the Wehrmacht began preparations. The date for the offensive was first proposed to be 4 May, but a series of delays followed with the date being pushed back repeatedly until the final date of 5 July was solidified. 45 These delays, adding up to nearly nine weeks, voided the prospect of surprise. There were two primary reasons for delay.
Colonel General Walter Model, and his 9 th Army needed more time to procure the necessary manpower, supplies and equipment to properly prepare for the northern pincer of the attack convinced Soviet Supreme Commander Josef Stalin that "it will be better if we wear the enemy out in defensive action, destroy his tanks, and then, taking in fresh reserves, by going over to an all-out offensive, we will finish off the enemies main grouping". 51 So Stalin and Zhukov decided "to meet the German attack with deeply echeloned defenses supplemented by counterattacks with reserves at every level". 52 "On much of the front there existed three "army" level defense lines, manned by units of a given army, three "front" lines, manned by front reserves and two reserve lines manned by the Steppe Front, a total of eight lines". 53, 54 These echeloned defenses were heavily fortified with thousands of anti-armor mines, tank trenches, elaborate barbed wire placements and a network of "mutually supporting strong points". 55 As positions were overrun the defenders would merely retreat to the next line where they would be reinforced by fresh defenders. This was known as elastic defense and was very effective in thwarting the advancing Germans on both shoulders of the salient. This elastic defense allowed for maximum resistance with minimum casualties. 58 This massive force was located at the nexus of the Center and Voronezh Fronts just behind the Kursk Bulge. 59, 60 The purpose of this front was to be a strategic reserve to contain any breakthroughs during the German attack, and to be the primary force to go on the offensive once the enemy attack had stalled. 61 The presence of this front behind the Kursk salient was not discovered by the German High Command due to a very meticulous and elaborate "tactical deception plan (maskirovka)". Execution of maskirovka was by "active and passive means" and included "false trenches, dummy tanks and artillery, notional tank dispersal areas, and false airfields". 62, 63 Largely due to these efforts, "German intelligence failed to detect ten armies" and thus, were not aware of much of the strategic reserves behind the Kursk salient. 64 By the summer of 1943, the Russians had developed a sophisticated intelligence process called "the Soviet razvedka system" operated by the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), "a well-articulated centralized structure to assess intelligence data". The
Soviets using "agent, air, and radio means" with the corroboration of British intelligence reports were able to "determine German offensive intent" at Kursk. 65 This information allowed the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (STAVKA) to prepare defenses and position reserves to absorb the attack, as they were able to determine the main points of penetration. 66, 67 Moscow was also receiving information about the proposed offensive from various intelligence networks, the most relevant of which were the "Lucy Spy Ring" based in Lucerne, Switzerland, where informants from the German High Command were leaking key information directly to the Soviets and the British Ultra effort, based in Bletchley Park, England,
where German transmissions were intercepted and decoded using the captured Enigma codes.
Rudolf Rossler-code named "Lucy"-handled an informant named "Werther" among other high level German informants. 68 Werther was a contact that had direct access to the German High Command. On 1 July 1943, when Hitler gave orders that the Kursk offensive would begin "between July 4 and July 6, Werther managed to pass this information to Moscow "within twenty-four hours". The Soviets, after analyzing all sources of intelligence, concluded that the likely window of attack was between July 3 and July 6. World War II" asserts that although Werther and Ultra "provided valuable material regarding overall enemy intentions", the Soviets relied mostly on their "intricate network of razvedka sources that covered the entire combat spectrum". 75 The Soviets possessed a thorough and comprehensive intelligence network that ranged from the tactical battlefield to the highest levels of the German command structure. This system was critical in preparing for and consequently thwarting the German attack.
THE BATTLE

THE TERRAIN
The Kursk region rests on a plateau called the Central Russian Uplands (see ' Figure 1 ' on page 10 for a map of the Kursk region and opposing force dispositions). This terrain is largely rolling plateau, sparsely populated with small groves of trees. This open country, with few obstacles to impede free movement, was good terrain for the movement of armored forces. The main obstacles were the rivers. In the south, the Northern Donets, southeast of Belgorod and east of Khar'kov, had high banks that created a natural barrier, making forward movement in this region difficult, if not impossible. Other notable rivers included the Psel, the Vorskla, and the Seim River, which ran through the city of Kursk from east to west. Rivers that ran along the defensive lines created natural barriers for the Soviet defenses and allowed defenders to predict likely routes for attacking forces and prepare defenses accordingly. When it was dry, most of the rivers were generally fordable; however, after even fairly short cloudbursts, the areas around these streams and rivers became a muddy mess that seriously impeded any efforts to move armor. 76 In the spring, it would generally rain all along the Eastern Front, causing nearly all offensive operations to shut down and wait for the dryer weather of the early summer before resuming. The railway system was the primary means of movement for armor and men, and the Germans used rail extensively. As one moved eastward toward the Russian areas, however, the railway network was sparse and reliance on trucks was necessary for rapid and efficient movement of men and supplies. Here, the trucks provided by Lend-Lease were of great importance to Russian mobility during combat operations. 77 The only paved road in the Kursk area was one that ran from Orel to Kursk and on to Belgorod, then Khar'kov. This was the only suitable road for armor movement. The remaining roads were largely dirt and unable to withstand sustained armor traffic.
THE FORCES
The following On the 6 th of July, the Russians responded with a powerful counterattack that was repelled by the Germans, resulting in many Russian casualties. By the end of the day, the Germans had regained lost territory and reached the second Soviet defensive belt in the center of the attack front area. In subsequent days, Model reinforced his attacking forces with additional Panzer divisions and continued his attempts to create a breakthrough. 88 But as
German efforts increased to push the Red Army back, so did the Russian's efforts to augment their defenses further with additional units and thus repel their attackers:
As soon as the blazing cauldron of fire had consumed one force, another would arrive to replace it and stoke the flames of combat. This was attrition war with a vengeance. Unless the German armored spearheads achieved operational freedom beyond the Soviet tactical defenses, resources and sheer willpower would determine the outcome of this bitter struggle. Model was resolved to achieve that operational freedom; Pukhov and Rokossovsky were equally determined to deny him the opportunity. 
The 4 th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf in the South
At 1600 on 4 July, the 48 th Panzer Corps launched a reconnaissance-in-force on the southern shoulder of the Kursk salient. This was to eliminate enemy outposts and observation points so that the subsequent main attack force could directly engage the first main line of defense. 91 Shortly after midnight, a powerful thunderstorm added to the confusion of the efforts in the German assembly areas. Then, at around 0110 on 5 July, to further obfuscate the German effort, the Soviet artillery struck in earnest all along the Voronezh front. By most accounts this artillery barrage seriously frustrated the attack effort. 92 The main German attack came at 0600 after an intense two-hour preparatory artillery barrage. 93 The Fourth Panzer Army The Fourth Panzer Army in the south had been largely successful at the time the attack was called off. 100 On July 13, "Hitler ruled that 'Citadel' was to be called off on account of the situation in the Mediterranean and the state of affairs in Central Army Group" effectively ending the Kursk offensive and any future major offenses by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front once and for all. 101 What followed was a continuous series of Soviet offensives that sent the Wehrmacht reeling and finally collapsing at the gates of Berlin in May of 1945.
WHY THE ATTACK FAILED
So why did the German attack fail? Multiple delays, German underestimation of the opposing Soviet forces, STAVKA's ability to predict the site of the attack through intelligence were some key reasons and will be explained in the following paragraphs.
as Field Marshall Manstein, argued that the delay allowed the Red Army to reinforce and prepare the shoulders of the salient. 103 Others say that the German Army was ill prepared to start the attack sooner. As we have noted: Model, and his 9 th Army needed more time to procure the necessary manpower, supplies and equipment to properly prepare for the northern pincer of the attack 104 and Hitler wanted to have as many Mark V Panther tanks and Mark VI Tiger tanks as possible. 105 The Wehrmacht grossly underestimated Russian forces on the Central Front. Soviet forces opposite Model's 9 th Army were "at least four times as strong in terms of infantry, and nearly twice as strong in terms of tanks, than they expected". 106 German artillery intelligence estimates were also grossly underestimated in this sector: "Russian artillery strength would have exceeded 1,800 guns in the assault zone650 more than the Germans estimated".
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The Germans also failed to detect the Steppe Reserve Front deployed in the area behind the Kursk salient in the spring and early summer of 1943: "German intelligence failed to detect ten armies" and thus were not aware of much of the strategic reserves behind the Kursk salient. 108 These underestimations were in no small part the result of elaborate deception measures by the Soviets as previously mentioned.
As previously explained, the Soviets had perfected an elaborate intelligence-gathering network. The GRU's "razvedka system" with the corroboration of other intelligence reports were able to "determine German offensive intent" at Kursk. 109 This allowed the Red Army to focus all of its efforts at reinforcing the Kursk area with men, armor and elaborate defense networks.
This was probably the most critical element of Soviet success because it allowed the Red Army to mass its considerable resources on a very narrow area of the front.
There were other factors that also should be considered: (1) the growing competence and operational flexibility of the Red Army units, (2) a lack of German infantry divisions and (3) the psychological boost to Soviet forces after the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. In addressing the first issue, Russian units were becoming more agile: "As a general rule, the Germans apparently missed-almost completely-the extent to which the Red Army had managed to reintroduce corps headquarters as an intermediate level of command. This error had little impact on strength estimates but a tremendous influence on any appreciation of Soviet operational and tactical flexibility". 110 Also, tank destroyer brigades, made up of SU-152s and other mechanized platforms were detached for flexibility. Many of these brigades were deployed reinforcing the northern and southern shoulders of the salient. These heavy artillery brigades were subordinate to the armies and fronts and not attached to specific frontline divisions. 111 This allowed the Red Army to focus incredible firepower in narrow areas along the German attack fronts. The lack of German infantry divisions was another issue. General
Theodor Busse, Chief of Staff, Army Group South, cited the inadequate number of Infantry divisions as a critical factor. "The lack of sufficient infantry divisions forced us to employ the mobile units from the outset". This also contributed to many of the spearhead armored units having to cover their own flanks encumbering forward progress. 112 Finally, the confidence of the Russians after Stalingrad was rising. Germany was no longer invincible. No longer were
German blitzkrieg tactics a surprise to their adversary.
It is important to note that the Germans continued with preparations for the attack even as aerial reconnaissance showed continual build up of Soviet defenses both in sophistication and depth. 113 Although all these things taken together created a cumulative effect that the Germans were unable to overcome, the key reasons for defeat were threefold and interrelated. First, Russian intelligence was able to predict precisely where and when the attack would occur and consequently allowed for the heavy reinforcement of the Russian defenses on the north and south shoulders of the salient. Finally Stavka deception efforts were successful in causing the Germans to grossly underestimate Soviet forces around the area of Kursk, specifically the Steppe Reserve Front which was not discovered and the defending forces on the northern shoulder of the salient were grossly underestimated.
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
In 1941, although the Eastern front was as wide as the continent of Russia itself, the Western Russia is to be destroyed" and later in the order "withdrawal of elements capable of combat into the extensive Russian land spaces is to be prevented". Capturing Moscow became the focus only when, late in 1941, the Red Army showed no signs of relinquishing the struggle. 114 The capture of Moscow was nearly achieved by December of 1941 when German men and armor literally had Moscow in their sites. Then on the 11 th of December 1941, 4 days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor; Hitler declared war against the United States. 115 This was an interesting move by Hitler in light of the fact that the Germans had already bitten off more than they could chew in North Africa and on the Eastern front.
The summer offensive of 1942 reflected a strategic shift to the Caucasus in the south with a secondary focus on the northern city of Leningrad. 116, 117 This new focus, as previously described, was to prevent Lend-Lease equipment and supplies from the U.S. and England from getting into Russia from their northern and southern routes 118 but more importantly, "taking possession of the Caucasus with its oil resources". 119 There was also the issue of Turkey; a successful campaign in the south would go a long way in securing an alliance. 120 Stalingrad was to be captured to secure the isthmus of the Volga and the Don. 121 The perceived importance of Stalingrad grew, as summer became winter. Initially the aim was to "eliminate the armaments factories there and secure a position on the Volga" but then Hitler "ignored the strategic rationale" the "Sixth Army would take and occupy Stalingrad". 122 For Hitler, the struggle for Stalingrad became an obsession devoid of strategic purpose: "he now had to capture the city which bore Stalin's name, as though this in itself would achieve subjugation of the enemy". 123 The final investment of men and armor far exceeded the strategic importance here and the Wehrmacht paid dearly with the loss of the powerful 6 th Army and four satellite armies.
In early 1943, following the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany's strategic picture had changed significantly. Prior to Kursk, the assumption in the west was that the war on the Eastern Front would be indecisive with one side winning battles at first and then the other. 124 "It would still have been conceivable to force stalemate if Germany's military leadership had been adapted to such a solution". 125 This assertion is arguable; Germany was not in a strong position to negotiate. The conflict was taking its toll on the Wehrmacht and contributions by Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian forces on the Eastern Front were rapidly decreasing while the Red Army was growing stronger. 126 According to Manstein, "Hitler would not accept giving up the Donetz area. He feared the repercussions on Turkey, for one thing. Most of all, he stressed the economic importance of Donetz coal to Germany's war economy and the effect on the enemy of continuing do be deprived of it". Manstein questioned the suitability of the coal in the Donetz region for use in industry in the first place. 127 Thus, Hitler was "pre-occupied with the economic aspects of the Donetz basin and apprehensive about the possible repercussions of an even temporary evacuation on the attitudes of Turkey and Rumania".
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"Hitler was correct in arguing that 1943 would be the last year in which the absence of an actual threat in the West permitted a maximum effort in Russia. As far as time was concerned, this was the last opportunity to deliver a crushing blow to Soviet offensive power before an invasion occurred in the west". 129 This may have been true but arguably a "crushing blow" or "forehand stroke", as Manstein referred to it, was no longer strategically feasible in light of the limited resources and multiple fronts of the Wehrmacht versus the overwhelming superiority in numbers and the regenerative capacity of the Red Army.
Outside the Eastern Front, there were other issues of grave importance to Nazi Germany.
The 
WAS KURSK DECISIVE?
Germany clearly suffered a crushing defeat at Kursk. The Wehrmacht did not destroy sizeable enemy forces and didn't eliminate STAVKA's intention to conduct a major offensive in 1943. Neither did the German Army achieve freedom of action nor consolidate their line.
Germany had also used up much of its reserves. 131 But was Kursk a decisive defeat or just another step in a series of defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht? To adequately address this, we must look at a number of strategic issues. These include attrition and replacement rates of men and armor, intelligence, ability of each side to focus their effort and political issues.
There is some speculation about German losses at Kursk being a decisive factor to the final outcome of the war. Total German losses at Kursk "were 56,827 men, which amounted to roughly 3 percent of the total 1,601,454 men the Germans lost in Russia during 1943". 132 The ability to reform the units suffering these losses was the real problem: "The armored formations, reformed and re-equipped with so much effort, had lost heavily in both men and equipment and would now be unemployable for a long time to come". Colonel General Heinz Guderian goes on to write: "It was problematic whether they could be rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern front". 133 It is difficult to argue with the fact that the attrition of German forces and consequently, the loss of an available strategic reserve allowed the Soviets to quickly capitalize and overwhelm the German at specific points following Kursk.
Another often discussed reason that Germany was unable to defeat the Red Army was the incredible Russian capacity to generate forces, albeit poorly trained, but in this case quantity
made up for what it lacked in quality. The Red Army, although often clumsy and awkward, had one thing going for it: nearly inexhaustible manpower. It "took the form of successive waves of newly mobilized armies, each taking its toll of the invaders before shattering and being replaced by the next wave. Its mobilization capability saved the Soviet Union from destruction in 1941
and again in 1942". 134 As efficient a killing machine the Wehrmacht was, even it had its limits to the men and machines it could destroyone would be hard pressed to find a better example of attrition on a massive scale. It is important to point out, however, that even with the amazing capacity for the Soviets to generate man and machine in huge numbers, the assumption that the Wehrmacht would lose to a battle of attrition was not a foregone conclusion. 135 The effectiveness of the 
ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION
Although in the summer of 1943, the German High Command had no real chance of turning the tide against the Soviets, it clearly had options that in large part could have altered the course and severity of their defeat. The prospect of a major "offensive on the scale of 1941
and 1942" was now a lost dream. 140 There were three courses of action available to Hitler: (1) go on a localized offensive while the remainder of the front employed a static defense; (2) conduct a static defense along the entire front; or (3) employ a mobile, flexible defense with well placed and timed counterattacks supported by a deeply echeloned strategic line of defense.
The first option, and the one chosen by Hitler and which we have discussed in some detail was to go on the offensive in powerful localized attacks while the remainder of the front maintained a static defense. Manstein put it this way: "in dealing the enemy powerful blows of a localized character which would sap his strength to a decisive degree". 141 As we have noted, this approach was very risky at best and thus had unrealistic expectations of success. The result has been recorded in the annals of history.
The second option would have been a static defense along the entire front. However, to defend a 2,000-kilometer front with limited forces would have been a monumental undertaking.
The idea of a static defense along the entire front was not realistic. There were simply not enough German divisions to do this effectively.
142 counterattacks supported by a deeply echeloned strategic line of defense. If successful this could bleed the Russians to the point where they could be amenable to a negotiated stalemate or at the least severely frustrate and delay the attacking Red Army. This option will now be discussed in some detail.
General Gunther Blumentritt, Deputy Chief of Staff under Chief of Staff Franz Halder describes the concept of "delaying action battle" where: "There are strategic and tactical situations, in which it can be shown that the battle, in the total sense, should be conducted neither offensively nor defensively but primarily in a 'delaying manner'". In a situation where opposing forces are pressing a weakened front "it is logical to order this front to conduct operations in a delaying manner and thereby to avoid exposing themselves to defeat or to heavy losses" and in order to preserve the army's strength "they should be led to a secure and well consolidated position". 143 The concept of "delaying action battle" is not unlike the Soviet Olbricht had also been told that Hitler believed the frontline troops would be tempted to withdraw to such a line. Olbricht later had said of the letter: "a historical document that may once be very important to us". 145 Arguably, such a line of defense would have delayed the Russian advance significantly and reduced the immense suffering incurred by the German people in the hands of a vengeful Red Army.
major German formations. However, the idea of limited offensive actions at critical times and places to hinder and frustrate the efforts of the Russians were not only possible but probably the most efficient use of limited forces to confound Russian offensive efforts and the best way to slow the Russian advance or even to force a stalemate. 146 The best way to time these offensive actions was to strike where the Red Army was most vulnerable: at the culmination of an offensive attack and then "to hit them hard on the backhand at the first opportunity".
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A stalemate was certainly entertained by some Generals such as Manstein. The attrition rates of the Russians even in 1943 were incredible. 148 It's not unreasonable to assume after two long years of horrible losses that the Russians would have considered such a prospect if the German attack at Kursk was successful. However, the feasibility of a negotiated ceasefire or peace is difficult to ascertain. It is doubtful that this was a real possibility, especially after the Allies decision, in 1942, to force the Third Reich into unconditional surrender. Additionally, after all the suffering the Wehrmacht inflicted on Russia and her people, wasn't Stalin bent on pounding the Germans back into Berlin?
Such ideas were all for naught in 1943 or any other time during the Russian campaign.
Hitler's "refusal to accept that elasticity of operations which, in the conditions obtaining from 1943 onwards, could be achieved only by a voluntary, if temporary surrender of conquered territory", showed his lack of appreciation for such operations. 149 "A 'Fanal' or beacon to the world of German resolve" maybe a sound strategic goal, but no longer consistent with military reality. Trying to reconcile the reality of the battlefield with this lofty strategic goal was not sound reasoning. Finally, Hitler's repeated rejection of a mobile defense and a strategic line of defense simply because he didn't want to give up any ground had no relevance to sound military strategy.
CONCLUSION
After Stalingrad, it became apparent that the Wehrmacht would probably not achieve decisive victory over the Red Army. In light of this, the Wehrmacht should not have dedicated so many of its precious and limited forces to an attack that had only a limited chance of success. The war was taking its toll on the Wehrmacht; from 22 June 1941 -1 July 1943 the German Army had lost 3,950,000 men on all fronts. 150 Germany was running out of options.
They had succeeded in angering the most powerful nations in the world into a total war footing aimed at smashing the Third Reich into unconditional surrender. The United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and all the resources these nations could muster proved to be too disciplined armies that the world has ever seen. Hitler's attempt to make the Kursk offensive a 
